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Why is private investment so low in Gulf compared to Western countries? We investigate cross-
regional differences in trust and reference points for trustworthiness as possible factors.  
Experiments controlling for cross-regional differences in institutions and beliefs about 
trustworthiness reveal that Gulf citizens pay much more than Westerners to avoid trusting, and 
hardly respond when returns to trusting change. These differences can be explained by subjects’ 
gain/loss utility relative to their region’s reference point for trustworthiness. The relation-based 
production of trust in the Gulf induces higher levels of trustworthiness, albeit within groups, than 
the rule-based interactions prevalent in the West.   
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I. Introduction 
Private domestic investment is low in Arab countries, particularly relative to public 
investment. In the Persian Gulf countries examined here, the private/public ratio was less than 
2 in the 1990s, for OECD countries it was over 6 [Sala-i-Martin and Artadi 2002].
 Investment 
requires placing one’s funds in the hands of another person.  Not surprisingly, investment rates 
are closely associated with people’s willingness to trust others [Knack and Keefer 1997]. Trust 
levels are generally low in Islamic societies. Across the fourteen Islamic countries surveyed in 
the World Values Survey, only 28 percent of the respondents indicated that ―most people can 
be trusted,‖ compared to 46 percent in Protestant European countries [Inglehart 2007].
1   
We investigate whether reference points for trustworthiness help explain these cross-
regional differences in people’s willingness to trust strangers. We build on Kahneman and 
Tversky’s [1979] Prospect Theory and the formalizations by Köszegi and Rabin [2006, 2007], 
and posit that betrayal imposes an additional utility cost beyond monetary loss. That cost 
increases the more the likelihood of betrayal deviates from one’s reference points of 
accustomed experience.  
Gulf residents are accustomed to higher levels of trustworthiness than Westerners. As is 
typical for tribal societies, most trust interactions take place within groups. Trust is fostered by 
decreasing the likelihood of betrayal through repeated interactions, reputation and reciprocity. 
―Aman [i.e., trust] … tends to convey a sense of personal attachment between those who trust 
one another rather than confidence in institutions, office-holders, or even one’s own knowledge 
or abilities. … For Arabs, who believe that it is contexts of relationship, not invariant 
capabilities, that most fully define a person, actively entangling them in webs of indebtedness 
                                                 
     
1 Interpersonal trust and more generally what Inglehart [2007] refers to as ―self-expression values‖ have also 
been associated with support for democracy.    3 
constitutes the greatest predictability and security that one can have for their actions towards 
oneself.‖ [Rosen 2000, p. 135-136]. Social networks have evolved to allow for such informal 
enforcement: ―Groups in the Middle East are necessarily more limited in size in order to 
maximize trust and cooperative endeavor… Asabiyya [―social solidarity‖] was most easily 
developed in small, informal, and highly personalistic groups.‖  [Bill and Springborg 2000, p. 
66-67]. Untrustworthy behavior often leads to expulsion, and xenophobia is common [e.g., 
Arab Human Development Report 2004; Inglehart et al. 2006].
 2 
In the West, by contrast, formal institutions, notably contract law, promote trust by 
decreasing the cost of betrayal by awarding damages given breach. Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. 
wrote about US law in1897: ―The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction 
that you must pay damages if you do not keep it and nothing else.‖ [Rosen 2000, p. 139].
3  
Given the differences in their trustworthiness reference points, people in the Gulf will 
demand higher levels of trustworthiness before trusting than Westerners. To examine 
experimentally, we elicit people’s minimum acceptable probability of trustworthiness, the 
threshold value that would make them just willing to trust a randomly selected, anonymous 
counterpart, given particular payoffs, in three Gulf countries, Kuwait, Oman and the United 
Arab Emirates, and two Western countries, Switzerland and the United States. The higher a 
person’s threshold, the higher the price—in loss of expected value of payoff—she is willing to  
 
                                                 
     
2 The Economist [April 9, 2005, p. 37] describes a recent case in Qatar where ―its rulers have just stripped some 
5,000 Qataris of their citizenship, apparently because they belong to a clan deemed disloyal.‖ Cultural theorists 
characterize the Gulf countries as ―collectivist‖ and Protestant Western countries as ―individualist‖ countries [e.g., 
Triandis 1995; Hofstede 2001]. They predict a stronger distinction between ―in-group‖ and ―out-group‖ members in 
the former than the latter. See also Greif [1994] and Kuran [2004].  
     
3 In Islamic Law, contracts that impose expectations on future performance are not permitted because they are 
inherently speculative [Rosen 2000, p. 142]. Specifically, there is no recovery for lost profits or other damages that 
are based on a counter-factual premise or speculation about events that did not occur [Vogel 1987].   4 
pay to avoid trusting. Our method eliminates institutional factors and beliefs about a 
counterpart’s trustworthiness as explanations. To control for differences in willingness to take 
risk, we elicit minimum acceptable probabilities for a straight gamble offering the same 
payoffs for the two parties as the trust game. The difference in values for the required 
probabilities when confronted with nature rather than a person isolates a person’s intolerance 
of betrayal. 
The utility structure we posit creates a second effect. It affects how responsive people 
are to changes in the likelihood or the cost of betrayal. We label the way people respond to 
changes in the expected returns from trusting as their elasticity of trust, and calibrate it using 
our experiments.  Elasticity of trust must be high if institutional innovations, such as laws that 
protect investors or enforce contracts, are to raise trust and investment. Our paper is organized 
as follows. Part II presents our theory and conceptual framework. Part III explains the 
experimental design, and Part IV presents the results. Part V concludes.  
II. Theory and Methods 
Trust is primarily produced by preventing betrayal through webs of relationships in the 
Gulf, but by mitigating the cost of betrayal through contract law in the West. This difference 
leads to differences in accustomed levels of trustworthiness in the two regions.  We posit that 
such trustworthiness experiences provide a reference point, r, for expectations of trustworthiness 
levels, rg and rw, respectively in the Gulf and Western nations, where rg >> rw.  We build on a 
model of reference-dependent preferences by Köszegi and Rabin [2006], who argue that 
individuals experience a loss aversion component when an outcome deviates from a reference 
point that is ―endogenously determined by the economic environment, derived from experiences 
in the past‖ [p. 1133].    5 
Consider two groups of individuals who must choose between lotteries S and T, Sure and 
Trust.  A lottery pays x with probability p and y<x with probability 1-p.  The total utility 
function is 
(1)        u(p,r,x,y) = pv(x) + (1-p)v(y) + z(p,r,x,y).                                                        
Here v is a traditional vonNeumann-Morgenstern (VN-M) utility function, where v’ > 0.  The 
innovation beyond traditional utility theory is that z(p,r,x,y) is a reference-dependent utility 
coming from the probability of trustworthiness itself.   
For T, 0<p<1, x=m and y=n<m.  For S, p=1, x=s, and the value of y is irrelevant.  For the 
choice to be meaningful, m>s>n.  Consistent with Koszegi and Rabin (and intuition), we assume 
that z is increasing with p and strictly decreasing with r.  This implies that u is increasing with p.  
For p=0, T is inferior to S; at p=1 it is superior.  Since the utility of S does not vary with p, there 
must be a minimum cutoff value pj that makes an individual j willing to trust. In particular, pj, 
sets u(S) = u(T), implying that 
(2)         pjv(m) + (1−pj)v(n) + z(pj rj,m,n) = v(s) + z(1,rj,m,n).                                     
(Hereafter, we suppress the arguments m and n in z, since they play no role.)   
       Consider individuals A and B with identical utility function (1).  The trustworthiness 
reference point for A, ra is greater than the trustworthiness reference point for B, rb. The critical 
assumption is that there is diminished importance for the reference when p = 1 (i,e., in lottery S).  
Specifically, for all reference points ra > rb and all probabilities of trustworthiness p < 1, 
(3)                    z(1,rb) − z(1,ra) < z(p,rb) − z(p,ra).     
 PROPOSITION. Given (3) and that z is increasing with p, an individual with a higher value of 
reference trustworthiness, r, will require a greater level of trustworthiness, p, in order to 
trust.   6 
The Proof is given in the Appendix.  In the context of our paper, the Proposition yields: 
Implication 1. Gulf citizens will require a higher level of trustworthiness than Westerners before 
they trust. 
To assess minimally required trustworthiness levels, p, we have subjects play a modified 
trust game [Camerer and Weigelt 1988] in the two regions. The game is shown in Figure 1.  
Figure 1 about here 
We ask individuals (principals) what minimum acceptable probability of trustworthiness, 
pj, would lead them to trust as opposed to receiving a sure payoff. The higher a principal’s 
minimum acceptable probability value, the more she is willing to sacrifice in expected value to 
avoid trusting. The amount she is willing to pay is the difference in expected values from her 
Trust and Sure strategies if pj is just satisfied. Representing the expected trust payoff in brackets, 
that amount is [pj 15 + (1- pj )8] – 10. Note, a principal’s minimum acceptable probability value 
should be independent of her assessments of the probability of trustworthiness in the game. If the 
actual trustworthiness level is below her threshold value, she will end up not trusting; and if 
trustworthiness is above it, she will get the actual level and reap a surplus. Thus truthful 
revelation is optimal.
4  Principals do not learn the true proportion of trustworthy agents in their 
game until after they have made their decisions. Moreover, the game offers no institutional 
protections.  Thus, observed differences in behavior cannot be accounted for by cross-regional 
differences therein. 
                                                 
     
4 Note that a principal cannot affect the probability she receives in the lottery, since it in no way relates to the 
answer that she provides. Given our procedure, truth-telling by a principal is as good as anything else.  It is strictly 
dominant if, as seems reasonable, people believe that actual levels of trustworthiness may lie in the immediate 
neighborhood of their minimum acceptable probability, and if they obey the Substitution Axiom of von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility.  Our procedure is closely related to the (strictly dominant) Becker-DeGroot-Marshak elicitation 
procedure. The major difference is that we do not draw our probability of payoff randomly from a uniform 
distribution, but rather observe it empirically. 
   7 
Willingness to trust is likely related to willingness to take risk. If people were 
accustomed to different levels of success when taking risk in the two regions, a similar logic 
would apply to willingness to take risk as to willingness to trust. Given that earning returns based 
on chance is strongly discouraged in Islamic Law, that gambling is strictly forbidden, and that 
Islamic banks tend to invest more conservatively then Western banks [Al-Suwailem 2000], there 
may well be cross-regional differences in success reference points leading to differences in 
willingness to take risk. In addition, there could also be differences in standard risk preferences.  
To make sure we are not merely picking up cross-regional differences in willingness to 
take risk in our experiments, we ran a control treatment in each country, the risky dictator game 
[Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004, Bohnet et al. 2008]. In it, Nature rather than the Agent determines 
the outcome. Figure 1 represents the risky dictator game. It is identical to the trust game except  
―Trust‖ is replaced with ―Gamble,‖ ―Agent‖ is replaced with ―Nature,‖ and ―Trustworthy‖ and 
―Betray‖ are respectively replaced with ―Success‖ and ―Failure.‖ A comparison of behavior in 
the trust game and the risky dictator game will tell us whether cross-regional differences in 
willingness to trust are due to differences in betrayal intolerance, differences in risk intolerance 
or a combination of the two. 
According to Implication 1, people in the West will trust for lower levels of 
trustworthiness than people in the Gulf. This also suggests that trust is more responsive to 
changes in the likelihood of trustworthiness in the West than in the Gulf. To examine, we 
compute the elasticity of trust. That elasticity tells how the percentage of those not trusting 
diminishes in response to a percentage reduction in those not trustworthy. Let α be the fraction of 
trusting principals, and β the fraction of trustworthy agents. Our elasticity concept looks at the 
curve x = f(β). The elasticity measure at each point is thus [dα/(1-α)]/[dβ/(1-β)]. Since our data is   8 
limited, we compute this elasticity looking only at decile intervals.  Thus, we measure the 
elasticity at each 10-percent increase of trustworthiness with start points at 0 to 90 percent.
5  To 
get an overall elasticity measure, we average these ten numbers.  
Implication 2. Trust levels will be less elastic to levels of trustworthiness in the Gulf than in the 
West. 
Given greater concern with levels of trustworthiness and lesser concern with monetary 
returns from trusting in the Gulf, Gulf citizens will respond less to changes in the cost of 
betrayal. We test this by comparing willingness to trust in a high-cost and a low-cost trust game.   
Implication 3. Trust levels will respond less to changes in the cost of betrayal in the Gulf than in 
the West. 
III. Design and Procedures 
As is traditional with experiments, we relied on student subjects, with 736 total subjects 
in the five countries.
6  The students were from Kuwait University in Kuwait, Sultan Qaboos 
University in Oman, the University of Zurich in Switzerland, UAE University in the United Arab 
Emirates, and from various universities in the greater Boston area in the United States. 
Participants’ average age and self-reported wealth levels on a scale from 1 (poor) to 6 (wealthy) 
were, respectively, 21 and 4.1 in Kuwait, 21 and 3.7 in Oman, 23 and 4.0 in Switzerland and 24 
                                                 
     
5 We exclude 100 percent as everyone is willing to trust if trustworthiness is guaranteed.  Thus, the elasticity in 
the final decile interval is always 1. 
     
6 As we are interested in comparisons between Gulf and Western countries, ideally we would have liked to run 
our experiments with representative samples of the general population in each country. However, this was not 
feasible in the three Gulf countries. To the best of our knowledge, not even Western surveys have been allowed to 
be conducted in any of the three countries to date (or any other Gulf country, for that matter). Our experiments 
represent five case studies. We do not claim that they are conclusive about behavior in either the Gulf or the West.    9 
and 3.5 in the United States.
7 We ran a total of 28 experimental sessions; 22 to 36 subjects 
participated in each.  
In Oman, Kuwait, Switzerland and the United States, we ran mixed-sex sessions.  In the 
UAE, this was not possible since higher education is sex segregated; experiments there were 
conducted separately for female and male subjects.
8  Subjects were identified by code numbers 
and kept anonymous to other players. They were randomly assigned to the role of principal or 
agent and randomly matched (single-blind). Table I provides an overview of the participants in 
our three sets of experiments, the baseline trust game, the risky dictator game, and a high-cost 
trust game. The high-cost trust game lowered the principal’s payoff given betrayal to 6 and 
raised the agent’s associated payoff to 24 points to determine how changes in the material cost of 
betrayal affected trust decisions. The probability that equates expected values in the first two 
games is 0.296; in the third (high-cost) game it is 0.444. 
Table I about here 
The payoffs were presented to subjects in a matrix form with neutral terminology, and no 
discussion of breakeven probabilities. Payoffs were given in points. Each point was converted to 
respectively 0.25 Kuwaiti Dinar, 0.2 Omani Rial, 1 Swiss frank, 1 UAE dirham, or 1 USA dollar 
at the end of the experiment.  Subjects earned a 10-point show up fee and received on average an 
additional 13 points for an experiment that took approximately 30-60 minutes. To ensure the 
                                                 
     
7 We collected this information in a short post-experimental questionnaire. We were not allowed to collect 
demographic information in the UAE. However, as the sessions there were segregated by sex, we can control for a 
person’s sex in all our analyses. 
     
8 To get a sense for how this might affect behavior, we added an all-male and an all-female session to our mixed-
sex session in Kuwait, a nation with substantial components of both single-sex and mixed-sex higher education. We 
believe that there are no analogous single-sex comparison groups in the West as people self-select into single-sex 
colleges in the West but not in the UAE.   10 
equivalence of experimental procedures across countries, we followed Roth et al. [1991] on 
designs for multinational experiments.
9  
The experiments were run as follows: In the trust games, we asked principals what 
minimum percentage of trustworthy behavior they would require to trust.  The neutral language 
description was: ―How large would the probability of being paired with a Person Y who chose 
option 1 minimally have to be for you to pick B over A?‖ (The agent’s ―option 1‖ is what we 
label ―trustworthy.‖ The principal’s choice ―B‖ is our ―trust.‖) We used the strategy method for 
agents:  Before they knew their principal’s decision, we asked them whether or not they would 
reward trust were it offered.  Specifically, we asked: ―Which option, 1 or 2, do you choose in 
case B?‖ If a principal’s minimum acceptable probability exceeded the percentage of trustworthy 
agents in a given session, p*, both principal and agent earned the sure payoff. If a principal’s 
minimum acceptable probability was equal to or lower than p*, the two payoffs were determined 
by the agent’s choice. Principals were informed on the whole procedure, including that agents’ 
decisions would be used to calculate p*. Agents were not informed that principals were asked to 
state their minimum acceptable probability of trustworthiness, nor that we would calculate a p*, 
since we did not want our elicitation procedure to affect agents’ decisions.  
In the risky dictator game, the principal becomes the ―dictator;‖ the agent is a ―recipient,‖ 
with no active role to play, as in the standard dictator game [Kahneman et al. 1986].  We asked 
principals to indicate their minimum acceptable probability of earning 15 such that they would 
take the gamble rather than the sure outcome: ―How large would the probability of receiving 
                                                 
     
9 We controlled for currency, language and experimenter effects to the best of our ability. To produce parity in 
rewards across the five nations, we used the most direct measure of opportunity cost of time we could find as a 
guideline, the hourly wage of an undergraduate research assistant. We had the instructions translated (and back-
translated) from English to Arabic.  The experiments were conducted by the first two listed authors. They first ran 
experiments in the US before conducting sessions in other countries. We did not find any evidence for experimenter 
effects in the US. The first author ran the experiments in Switzerland and the UAE, and the second author ran the 
experiments in Kuwait and Oman. The instructions are available from the authors upon request.   11 
option 1 minimally have to be for you to pick B over A?‖ They were informed that p* had been 
predetermined and was inside the envelope visibly posted to the blackboard. The average 
likelihood of trustworthiness from the baseline trust games in a given country served as p* for 
the risky dictator games, which were conducted with different subjects after the trust games. If a 
principal’s minimum acceptable probability was higher than the predetermined probability, p*, 
they were taken to reject the gamble. They were then paid the sure payoff. If their minimum 
acceptable probability was less than or equal to p*, we conducted the lottery by drawing a ball 
from an urn containing p* good and (1-p*) bad balls. This determined whether principals 
received the 15 or the 8 payment; the complementary 15 or 22 payment went to their recipient. 
Before subjects made their decision, they had to complete a quiz testing their 
understanding. Only after all subjects understood the problem and could calculate their earnings 
for different values of hypothetical pj and p*
 did we proceed with the experimental decisions. 
After subjects had made their decisions, and had given us the demographic information we were 
allowed to collect, we informed everyone on the details of the experimental procedure and the 
results. Subjects presented their code number to collect a sealed envelope with their earnings. 
IV. Results  
We first examine Implication 1 from our Proposition, namely that people in the Gulf will 
require higher levels of trustworthiness before trusting than Westerners. We then compare 
required trustworthiness levels with required success levels in the risky dictator game to make 
sure behavior in the trust game is not just due to people’s willingness to take risk. Finally, we 
report results for Implications 2 and 3, namely, how responsive people are to changes in the 
likelihood or the cost of betrayal. Table II summarizes principals’ willingness to trust. 
Table II about here   12 
On average, people in the Gulf countries are willing to trust if at least 70 percent of the 
people are trustworthy while people in the Western countries are willing to trust if at least 52 
percent of the people are trustworthy. This cross-regional difference is significant
10 for each 
cross-regional country comparison. Emiratis, Kuwaitis and Omanis require significantly higher 
levels of trustworthiness before trusting than do Swiss and Americans. This affirms Implication 
1. Table III reports a simple regression with the minimum acceptable probability as the 
dependent variable. In Columns 1 and 2 we group the countries by region (Gulf = 1) and control 
for sex (woman = 1), the sex composition of our sessions (mixed = 1), and the possible 
interaction variables. Principals in the Gulf countries require higher minimum acceptable 
probabilities than Western principals. Columns 3 to 5 treat each country separately, with the 
United States the excluded group. Minimum acceptable probabilities do not differ between 
Switzerland and the United States, and the cross-regional difference in minimum acceptable 
probabilities is due to both sexes in the Emirates and Oman, but only to men in Kuwait. Kuwaiti 
women request probability thresholds on a par with their Western counterparts.
11  
Table III about here 
To determine whether people’s willingness to trust reflects primarily their willingness to 
take risk, we compare the probability thresholds for trusting (Table II) with the thresholds for 
risk-taking. Table IV presents principals’ minimum acceptable probabilities in the risky dictator 
game in the five countries. We find that the mean minimum acceptable probabilities in the trust 
game significantly exceed those of the risky dictator game in all countries, namely by 0.16 in 
Kuwait, 0.26 in Oman, 0.33 in the UAE, 0.11 in Switzerland and 0.22 in the United States (with 
                                                 
     
10 We run one-tailed Mann-Whitney U tests for differences in means. All p-values reported are based on this test, 
unless noted otherwise. A difference is reported as significant if p < 0.05. 
     
11 Kuwait ranks highest on the gender-related development index in the Arab world [Table 3, AHDR 2004]. On 
May 16, 2005, the Kuwaiti parliament voted to give women the right to vote and to run for political office.    13 
p < 0.05 everywhere except p < 0.1 in Switzerland). This implies that all subjects thought it 
worse to lose the high payment due to betrayal than due to an unlucky draw on a chance device 
i.e., were intolerant to betrayal. 
Table IV about here 
On average, people in the Gulf are willing to take risk if the likelihood of getting the 
good outcome is at least 46 percent while their counterparts in the West are willing to do so for a 
minimum acceptable probability of at least 36 percent. This cross-regional difference is mainly 
driven by men. Repeating the analysis conducted for the trust game (comparisons of means using 
Mann-Whitney tests and regressions), we find that Gulf men are significantly less willing to take 
risk than Western men while there are no cross-regional differences in risk-taking for women.  
Overall, the cross-regional difference in willingness to trust is mainly due to differences 
in intolerance to betrayal. This supports our notion that trust behavior responds to differences in 
trustworthiness reference points across the regions. In addition, for men, there are also cross-
regional differences in willingness to take risk.  
To see how responsive willingness to trust is to changes in the likelihood of betrayal, 
Figure II shows the percentage of principals willing to trust for given likelihoods of 
trustworthiness in the two regions.  
Figure II about here 
Emiratis, Kuwaitis and Omanis’ willingness to trust is less elastic to changes in the 
likelihood of trustworthiness than that of Westerners. Our elasticity measure indicates how on 
average the percentage of those not trusting responds to a percentage reduction in those not 
trustworthy for each 10-percent change in trustworthiness.  Table V presents the results, with the 
UAE at the bottom and Switzerland at the top. This supports Implication 2.   
                                                                                                                                                             
   14 
Table V about here 
To examine how responsive willingness to trust is to changes in the cost of betrayal, we 
compare the required trustworthiness thresholds in the basic trust game and the high-cost trust 
game in Oman and the United States (the only two countries studied).  We find a similar pattern 
as above. Americans respond to changes in the material cost of betrayal, Omanis do not. Table 
VI presents principal’s minimum acceptable probability values for the two games in the two 
countries. Americans request significantly higher minimum acceptable probabilities in the high-
cost than in the baseline trust game. Omanis’ minimum acceptable probabilities, by contrast, 
differ hardly at all across the two conditions.
12 This supports Implication 3.   
Table VI about here 
Our major interest is why and when people trust strangers, hence our focus on the 
behavior of principals. But agents’ responses are interesting as well, although they do not entail 
any information on cross-regional differences in accustomed levels of trustworthiness. In our 
experiments, betrayal entails neither reputational nor legal costs – prime concerns respectively in 
the Gulf and the West – and thus primarily reflect a person’s intrinsic motivation to be 
trustworthy. There are no significant cross-regional differences in our agents’ willingness to 
reward trust. In our baseline trust game, 43 percent of the agents chose to reward trust in Kuwait 
(N = 39), 31 percent in Oman (N = 29), 32 percent in the United Arab Emirates (N = 28), 28 
percent in Switzerland (N = 25) and 29 percent in the United States (N = 31).
13  
 
                                                 
     
12 The trustworthiness rates in the high-cost trust games—not relevant for the probability thresholds—are alike in 
the two countries: 36 percent are trustworthy in the US (N = 36) and 37 percent in Oman (N = 35). . 
     
13 None of the differences between these percentages is significant (e.g., chi
2-test p = 0.21 when comparing 
Kuwait and Switzerland, the two extremes). Calculating weighted averages for each region gives us a 
trustworthiness rate of 37 percent in the three Gulf and 29 percent in the two Western countries (chi
2-test p = 0.32).     15 
V. Conclusion 
Private investment levels and trust levels are lower in Gulf than in Western countries. 
This paper shows that differences in accustomed levels of trustworthiness might contribute to 
this pattern, leading people in the Gulf to require higher levels of trustworthiness before trusting 
than Westerners. In the Gulf, trust has traditionally been primarily produced by relying on 
personal relationships while in the West formal rules, such as contract law, play an important 
role. Relation-based trust decreases the likelihood of betrayal; rule-based trust decreases the cost 
of betrayal. Thus, the reference points for trustworthiness are higher in the Gulf than in the West. 
Following Köszegi-Rabin [2006], we posited a gain-loss utility for accepting a level of 
trustworthiness below one’s reference level.  This utility adds to the pure von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility from the game’s monetary payoffs.  Given their higher trustworthiness 
reference points, people in the Gulf should be willing to pay a higher price to avoid trusting than  
people in the West. Our experiments confirmed this prediction. Emiratis, Kuwaitis and Omanis 
demanded a substantially higher minimum trustworthiness threshold before trusting than did the 
Americans and Swiss, well exceeding the probability thresholds required to take risk in an 
analogous game, where Nature determined the outcome. Cross-regional differences in 
willingness to trust mainly came from differences in people’s intolerance of betrayal, though for 
men differences in willingness to take risk also contributed.  
Differences in trust preferences, brought about by differences in the reference points for 
trustworthiness for the two regions, help us understand disparities in private investment rates. 
Beyond trust levels, a better understanding of preferences that depend on reference points may 
prove particularly useful when comparing countries or cultures.   16 
APPENDIX  
Define pa and pb to be the minimum levels of trustworthiness such that A and B 
respectively select Trust. We show that at trustworthiness level pb, A does not select Trust, 
implying that the pa > pb. Set p = pb for individual A.  Then by (3) 
(4)            z(1,rb) − z(1,ra) < z(pb,rb) − z(pb,ra).                                                          
Rearranging terms yields z(1,rb) − z(pb,rb) < z(1,ra) − z(pb,ra).  Furthermore, (2) implies that 
(5)              pb v(x) + (1 − pb)v(y) + z(pb, rb) = v(s) + z(1,rb).                                                      
Substituting terms in (4) and (5) yields 
(6)          pbv(x) + (1 − pb)v(y) + z(pb,ra) <  v(s) + z(1,ra)  .                                                       
The LHS of (6) is simply the utility of Trust for A at trustworthiness level pb, and the RHS is A’s 
utility of Sure.  This inequality implies that at pb A does not select Trust. Since the sum of the 
VN-M terms and z are both increasing with p, and that at p=1 A does trust, there must a value pa 
> pb that gets A to trust.  QED. 
     Note, we have not required the stronger condition of continuity of z in its arguments, 
and only require (3) to hold when p=1 for the Sure lottery.  Had we assumed continuity and 
differentiability, a sufficient condition replacing (3) would be that ∂
2z/∂r∂p>0.  
     In the context of our paper, the Proposition implies that Gulf citizens will require a 
higher level of trustworthiness than Westerners to Trust.    
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TABLE I: Numbers of Participants in the Different Subject Pools 
 
  Mixed  All Men  All Women 
Baseline Trust Game       
Kuwait   24  26  28 
Oman  58     
United Arab Emirates    28  28 
Switzerland  50        
United States  62       
 
Risky Dictator Game 
     
Kuwait  32  28  20 
Oman  44     
United Arab Emirates    30  30 
Switzerland  48     
United States  58     
 
High-cost Trust Game 
     
Oman   70       
United States  72       
    
TABLE II: Minimum acceptable probabilities in Baseline Trust Game 
Mean, Median, [N]   
 
 
All  Men  Women 
Kuwait
14 
 
 
0.61 
0.70 
[39] 
0.74 
0.80 
[15] 
0.53 
0.50 
[24] 
Oman 
 
0.72 
0.80 
[29] 
0.72 
0.70 
[12] 
0.73 
0.80 
[16] 
United Arab 
Emirates 
0.81 
0.80 
[28] 
0.77 
0.80 
[14] 
0.86 
0.95 
[14] 
Switzerland  0.51 
0.55 
[25] 
0.46 
0.48 
[18] 
0.62 
0.60 
[7] 
United States  0.54 
0.50 
[31] 
0.50 
0.50 
[19] 
0.61 
0.72 
[12] 
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TABLE III: Determinants of minimum acceptable probabilities in the Baseline Trust Game 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
Gulf countries  0.175**  0.249**       
  (0.041)  (0.075)       
Kuwait      0.065  0.063  0.243** 
      (0.056)  (0.057)  (0.079) 
Oman      0.179**  0.176**  0.217* 
      (0.060)  (0.062)  (0.084) 
Switzerland      0.036  0.035  0.034 
      (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.075) 
UAE      0.269**  0.268**  0.270** 
      (0.061)  (0.062)  (0.080) 
Women    0.095    0.009  0.116 
    (0.123)    (0.040)  (0.084) 
Mixed session    -0.018       
    (0.079)       
Gulf countries*Women    -0.183^       
    (0.105)       
Women*Mixed session    0.039       
    (0.103)       
Kuwait*Women          -0.332** 
          (0.113) 
Oman*Women          -0.105 
          (0.121) 
Switzerland*Women          0.037 
          (0.132) 
UAE*Women          -0.027 
          (0.120) 
Constant  0.527**  0.500**  0.543**  0.539**  0.498** 
  (0.032)  (0.089)  (0.042)  (0.045)  (0.052) 
Observations  152  151  152  151  151 
R-squared  0.11  0.15  0.18  0.18  0.25 
Standard errors in parentheses, ^ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
                                                                                                                                                             
     
14 There are no significant differences in same-sex and mixed-sex sessions for either men or women. Men’s 
behavior varies not at all; women are slightly though not significantly more willing to trust in same-sex than in 
mixed-sex sessions.    19 
TABLE IV:  Minimum acceptable probabilities in Risky Dictator Game 
Mean, Median, [N] 
 
 
 
All  Men  Women 
Kuwait 
 
 
0.44 
0.42 
[40] 
0.46 
0.43 
[25] 
0.40 
0.27 
[15] 
Oman 
 
0.47 
0.45 
[22] 
0.49 
0.48 
[8] 
0.43 
0.40 
[13] 
United Arab Emirates  0.48 
0.48 
[30] 
0.51 
0.50 
[15] 
0.46 
0.45 
[15] 
Switzerland  0.40 
0.42 
[24] 
0.33 
0.30 
[13] 
0.48 
0.50 
[11] 
United States  0.32 
0.29 
[29] 
0.28 
0.29 
[16] 
0.38 
0.35 
[13] 
 
 
TABLE V: Elasticity of Trust to the Likelihood of Trustworthiness 
 
  Elasticity of Trust 
Kuwait  0.81 
Oman  0.57 
UAE  0.21 
Switzerland  1.17 
USA  1.03 
 
 
 
TABLE VI: Minimum acceptable probabilities in Baseline and High-cost Trust Games 
Mean, Median, [N] 
 
 
 
All 
Baseline 
All 
High-cost 
Men 
High-cost 
Women 
High-cost 
Oman 
 
 
0.72 
0.80 
[29] 
0.71 
0.75 
[35] 
0.72 
0.75 
[23] 
0.68 
0.78 
[12] 
United States 
 
0.54 
0.50 
[31] 
0.69 
0.75 
[36] 
0.60 
0.70 
[16] 
0.77 
0.80 
[18]   20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE I: The Trust Game 
[Payoffs to Principal; payoffs to Agent] 
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FIGURE II: Cumulative Distribution of Willingness to Trust in the West and in the Gulf 
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